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Abstract
In the m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer (OT ) model,
one party Alice sends n bits to another party Bob, Bob
can get only m bits from the n bits. However, Alice
cannot know which m bits Bob received. Y.Mu and
Naor presented classical m-out-of-n Oblivious Trans-
fer based on discrete logarithm. As the work of Shor,
the discrete logarithm can be solved in polynomial time
by quantum computers, so such OT s are unsecure to
the quantum computer. In this paper, we construct
a quantum m-out-of-n OT (QOT ) scheme based on
the transmission of polarized light and show that the
scheme is robust to general attacks, i.e. the QOT
scheme satisfies statistical correctness and statistical
privacy.
Keywords. Quantum, Oblivious Transfer.
1 Introduction
A number of recent papers have provided com-
pelling evidence that certain computational, crypto-
graphic, and information theoretic tasks can be per-
formed more efficiently by models based on quantum
physics than those based on classical physics [9].
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is used as a key compo-
nent in many applications of cryptography [11, 5, 10].
Informally speaking in an Oblivious Transfer, Alice
sends a bit to Bob that he receives half the time (this
fact is out of their control), Alice does not find out
what happened, Bob knows if he get the bit or nothing.
Similarly, in a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer, Alice has
two bits b0, b1 that she sends to Bob in such a way that
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he can decide to get either of them at his choosing but
not both. Alice never finds out which bitBob received.
In 2001, Naor presented a 1-out-of-n Oblivious
Transfer [8], Y.Mu showed that m-out-of-n Oblivious
Transfer could also be realized based on the discrete
logarithm. In the m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer(1 ≤
m < n) , Alice sends n bits to Bob, Bob can get onlym
of them. In the case of quantum, Claude Cre´peau pro-
vided a 1-out-of-2 quantum Oblivious Transfer based
on the transmission of polarized light in 1994. The
protocol of Cre´peau’s can be used directly to imple-
ment a one-out-of-three Oblivious Transfer.
The organization of this paper is as following: in
section 2, we give the definitions of the correctness
and privacy of the m-out-of-n OT protocol. In section
3, we review the 1-out-of-2 OT of Claude Cre´peau and
its intuition. In section 4, we construct an m-out-of-n
OT, and in section 5 we show that this scheme satisfies
statistical correctness and statistical privacy .
2 Definitions
The natural constraints(see below) of correctness
and privacy of am-out-of-n OT(1 ≤ m < n) is showed
below.
Definition 2.1 Perfect Correctness: It should be
that when Alice and Bob follow the protocol and start
with Alice′s input bits b1, b2, · · · , bn and Bob′s input
c1, c2, . . . , cm ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, they finish with Bob get-
ting bc1 , bc2 , · · · , bcm ∈ { b1, b2, · · ·, bn}.
Definition 2.2 Perfect Privacy: It should be that,
Alice can not find out about c1, c2, . . . , cm, and Bob
can not find out more than m of b1, b2, . . . , bn.
The protocol we describe in the next section is of
probabilistic nature. We cannot show that this proto-
col perfectly satisfies the above constraints but satis-
fies in a statistical sense: after an amount of work in
O(N) time the protocol will satisfy for some positive
constant ǫ < 1.
Definition 2.3 Statistical Correctness: It should
be that , except with probability at most εN , when
Alice and Bob follow the protocol and start with
Alice′s input bits b1, b2, . . . , bn and Bob
′s input
c1, c2, . . . , cm ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} they finish with Bob get-
ting bc1, bc2 , · · · , bcm ∈ {b1, b2, · · · , bn}.
Definition 2.4 Statistical Privacy: It should be
that, except with probability at most ǫN , Alice can not
find out c1, c2, . . . , cm, and Bob can not find out more
than m of b1, b2, . . . , bn.
3 Quantum 1-out-of-2 Oblivious
Transfer
In this section, we introduce the quantum 1-out-
of-2 OT provided by Claude Cre´peau [3]. Let c©|
denote the random variable that takes the binary
value 0 with probability 1/2 and 1 with probability
1/2. Also, denote by [ ]i the selection function such
that [a0, a1, · · · , ak]i = ai. Let ↔l = (|↔〉, | ↑↓〉) and
տցրւ = (|տց〉, |րւ〉) denote respectively the bases of recti-
linear and diagonal polarization in the quantum state
space of a photon. The quantum 1-out-of-2 OT is as
follows:
3.1 Quantum 1-out-of-2 OT
Protocol 3.1 1-out-of-2 OT(b0, b1)(c)
1. DO2ni=1
• Alice picks a random bit ri ← c©|
• Alice picks a random bit βi ← c©| and defines
her emission basis (|ϕi〉, |ϕ⊥i 〉)← [↔l,տցրւ]βi
• Alice sends to Bob a photon πi with polar-
ization [|ϕi〉, |ϕ⊥i 〉]ri
• Bob picks a random bit β′i ← c©| and measures
πi in basis (|θi〉, |θ⊥i 〉)← [↔l,տցրւ]β′i
• Bob sets
r′i ←
{
0, if πi is observed as |θi〉
1, if πi is observed as |θ⊥i 〉
2. DOni=1
• Bob runs commit(r′i), commit(β
′
i),
commit(r′n+i), commit(β
′
n+i) with Alice
• Alice picks ci ← c©| and announces it to Bob
• Bob runs unveil(r′nci+i), unveil(β
′
nci+i
)
• Alice checks that βnci+i = β
′
nci+i
→
rnci+i = r
′
nci+i
• if ci = 0 then Alice sets βi ← βn+i and ri ←
rn+i and Bob set β
′
i ← β
′
n+i and r
′
i ← r
′
n+i
3. Alice announces her choices β1β2 · · ·βn to Bob
4. Bob randomly selects two subsets I0, I1 ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , n} subject to |I0| = |I1| = n/3, I0∩I1 =
∅ and ∀i ∈ Ic, βi = β′i, and he announces 〈I0, I1〉
to Alice
5. Alice receives 〈J0, J1〉=〈I0, I1〉, computes and
sends b̂0 ← b0⊕
⊕
j∈J0
rj and b̂1 ← b1⊕
⊕
j∈J1
rj
6. Bob receives 〈̂b0, b̂1〉 and computes bc ← b̂c ⊕⊕
j∈Jc
r′j
3.2 Intuition behind 1-out-of-2 OT
In this 1-out-of-2 QOT, Alice must prevent Bob
from storing the photons and waiting until she dis-
closes the bases before measuring them, which would
allow him to obtain both of Alice′s bits with certainty.
To realize this, Alice gets Bob to commit to the bits
that he received and the bases that he used to measure
them. Before going ahead with ri, say, Alice checks
that Bob had committed properly to rn+i when he
read that bit in the basis that she used to encode it.
If at any stage Alice observes a mistake (βn+i = β
′
n+i
but rn+i 6= r′n+i), she stops further interaction with
Bob who is definitely not performing his legal protocol
(this should never happen if Bob follows his protocol).
In this protocol, r1r2 · · · rn are chosen by Alice in
step 1 and are sent to Bob via an ambiguous coding re-
ferred to as the BB84 coding [1]: when Alice and Bob
choose the same emission and reception basis, the bit
received is the same as what was sent and uncorre-
lated otherwise. Bob builds two subsets: one Ic that
will allow him to get bc, and one Ic that will spoil bc.
The calculations of steps 5-6 are much that all the bits
in a subset must be known by Bob in order for him
to be able to obtain the output bit connected to that
subset.
4 Protocol for Quantum m-out-of-n
Oblivious Transfer
4.1 Weak Bit Commitment
In 1993, Gilles Brassard, etc provided a quan-
tum bit commitment scheme provably unbreakable by
both parties [2]. However, unconditionally quantum
bit commitment was showed impossible [7]. In [4],
Aharonov provided a weak bit commitment.
Definition 4.1 [4] In the weak bit commitment pro-
tocol, the following requirements should hold.
• If both Alice and Bob are honest, then both Alice
and Bob accept.
• (Binding) If Alice tries to change her mind about
the value of b, then there is non zero probability
that an honest Bob would reject.
• (Sealing) If Bob attempts to learn information
about the deposited bit b, then there is non zero
probability that an honest Alice would reject.
In the following scheme, Bob will use this weak quan-
tum bit commitment to commit.
4.2 Intuition for m-out-of-n OT
In the m-out-of-n OT, Bob should build n subsets
I1, I2, . . . , In ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n}, m of that will allow him
to get bc1 , bc2 , . . . , bcm (c1, c2, . . . , cm ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}),
and the other I’s will spoil the remnant b’s. In I1 ∪
I2∪· · ·∪In, the rate of the i’s satisfying β′i = βi would
be more than m
n
and less than m+1
n
. i.e.
m
n
≤
#{i|βi = β′i, i ∈ I1 ∪ · · · ∪ In}
|I1 ∪ · · · ∪ In|
<
m+ 1
n
In our scheme, we let the rate to be
m
n
+m+1
n
2 =
2m+1
2n .
As β’s and β′’s are choice randomly, we have
lim
N→∞
#{βi = β′i}
N
=
1
2
.
For a large N , the rate of i’s in {1, 2, · · · , N} that
satisfy β′i = βi would be approximately
1
2 , then Bob
should remove some i’s from the {1, 2, · · · , N}. The
number of i’s that should be removed can be calcu-
lated as following:
If 2m+12n <
1
2 , there are more i’s that satisfy β
′
i = βi
than required, so Bob should remove x i’s that satis-
fying β′i = βi from {1, 2, · · · , N}. x can be calculated
as follows:
N
2 − x
N − x
=
2m+ 1
2n
x =
n− (2m+ 1)
2n− (2m+ 1)
N
If 2m+12n ≥
1
2 , there are more i’s that satisfy β
′
i 6= βi
than required, so Bob should remove x i’s that satis-
fying β′i 6= βi from {1, 2, · · · , N}. x can be calculated
as follows:
N
2
N − x
=
2m+ 1
2n
x =
(2m+ 1)− n
2m+ 1
N
N must satisfy (2n−(2m+1))(2m+1)|((2m+1)−n)N
so that x would be an interger. we let the i’s that was
removed from {1, 2, · · · , N} be u1, u2, · · · , ux.
4.3 Quantum m-out-of-n OT
In the m-out-of-n QOT , Alice has input
b1, b2, · · · , bn, Bob has input c1, c2, · · · , cm. The output
of the scheme is bc1 , bc2, · · · , bcm .
Protocol 4.1 m-out-of-n
QOT(b1, b2, . . . , bn)(c1, c2, . . . , cm)
1. DO2Ni=1
• Alice picks a random bit ri ← c©|
• Alice picks a random bit βi ← c©| and defines
her emission basis (|ϕi〉, |ϕ⊥i 〉)← [↔l,տցրւ]βi
• Alice sends to Bob a photon πi with polar-
ization [|ϕi〉, |ϕ⊥i 〉]ri
• Bob picks a random bit β′i ← c©| and mea-
sures πi in basis (|θi〉, |θ⊥i 〉)← [↔l,տցրւ]β′i
• Bob sets
r′i ←
{
0, if πi is observed as |θi〉
1, if πi is observed as |θ⊥i 〉
2. DONi=1
• Bob runs commit(r′i), commit(β
′
i),
commit(r′N+i), commit(β
′
N+i) with Alice
• Alice picks di ← c©| and announces it to
Bob
• Bob runs unveil(r′Ndi+i), unveil(β
′
Ndi+i
)
• Alice checks that βNdi+i = β
′
Ndi+i
→
rNdi+i = r
′
Ndi+i
• if di = 0 then Alice sets βi ← βN+i and
ri ← rN+i and Bob set β′i ← β
′
N+i and r
′
i ←
r′N+i
3. Alice announces her choices β1β2 · · ·βN to Bob
4. DOxj=1
• If 2m+12n <
1
2 Bob runs unveil(r
′
uj
),
unveil(β′uj) that satisfying βuj = β
′
uj
, Alice
checks that βuj = β
′
uj
→ ruj = r
′
uj
• If 2m+12n ≥
1
2 Bob runs unveil(r
′
uj
),
unveil(β′uj) that satisfying βuj 6= β
′
uj
5. Bob randomly selects n subsets I1, I2, · · · , In ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , N} − {u1, u2, . . . , ux} subject to |I1| =
|I2| = · · · = |In| = (N −x)/n, ∀j 6= k, Ij ∩ Ik = ∅
and ∀j ∈ Ic1 ∪ Ic2 ∪ · · · ∪ Icm , βj = β
′
j, and he
announces 〈I1, I2, · · · , In〉 to Alice
6. Alice receives 〈J1, J2, · · · , Jn〉=〈I1, I2, · · · , In〉,
computes and sends b̂1 ← b1 ⊕
⊕
j∈J1
rj , b̂2 ←
b2 ⊕
⊕
j∈J2
rj , · · ·, b̂n ← bn ⊕
⊕
j∈Jn
rj to Bob
7. Bob receives 〈̂b1, b̂2, · · · , b̂n〉 and computes bci ←
b̂ci ⊕
⊕
j∈Jci
r′cj , i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
5 Analysis
In them-out-of-n QOT , Bobmust read the photons
sent by Alice as they come: he cannot wait and read
them later, individually or together. We assume that
the channel used for the quantum transmission is free
of errors, so that it is guaranteed that r′i = ri whenever
β′i = βi. we now show that under the assumption this
protocol satisfies the statistical version of the above
constraints.
5.1 Correctness
Lemma 5.1 Hoefding inequality [6] Let
X1, X2, · · · , Xn be total independent random variables
with identical probability distribution so that E(Xi) =
µ and the range of Xi is in [a, b]. Let the simple av-
erage Y = (X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xn)/n and δ > 0, then
Pr[|Y − µ| ≥ δ] ≤ 2 · e
−2n·δ2
b−a
So, if Pr[Xi = 0] = Pr[Xi = 1] =
1
2 , then µ =
1
2
and a = 0, b = 1, we have the following inequality
Pr[|
n∑
i=1
Xi
n
−
1
2
| ≥ δ] ≤ 2 · e−2·nδ
2
We show that most of the time the output is cor-
rect if the parties abide to their prescribed protocol.
In a given run of the protocol, Bob will succeed in
computing bc1 , bc2 , . . . , bcm properly provided satisfy-
ing the following conditions :
when 2m+12n <
1
2
#{i|βi = β
′
i} − x ≥ (N − x)m/n
or when 2m+12n ≥
1
2
#{i|βi = β
′
i} ≥ (N − x)m/n
Because in that case he can form Ic1 , Ic2 , . . . , Icm as
prescribed and then he can compute the output bit as
b̂ci ⊕
⊕
j∈Ici
r′j which is
b̂ci⊕
⊕
j∈Ici
r′j = bci⊕
⊕
j∈Jci
rj
⊕
j∈Ici
r′j = bci⊕
⊕
j∈Ici
rj⊕ r
′
j
because Jci is Ici . Since βi = β
′
i → rj ⊕ r
′
j = 0 makes
all the right terms vanish, we end up with
b̂ci ⊕
⊕
j∈Ici
r′j = bci
Therefore the protocol gives the correct output unless
satisfying the following conditions :
when 2m+12n <
1
2
#{i|βi = β
′
i} − x < (N − x)m/n
or when 2m+12n ≥
1
2
#{i|βi = β
′
i} < (N − x)m/n
in which case Bob is unable to form the set
Ic1 , Ic2 , . . . , Icm as prescribed. Now, we can calculate
the probability that Bob can not form Ic1 , Ic2 , . . . , Icm
If 2m+12n <
1
2 (i.e. 2m+1 < n, x =
n−(2m+1)
2n−(2m+1)N), then
the probability that Bob can get less than m bits is
given by
P [#{i|βi = β
′
i} − x < (N − x)m/n]
= P [#{i|βi = β
′
i} < (N − x)m/n+ x]
= P [
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i > N − ((N −
n− (2m+ 1)
2n− (2m+ 1)
N)m/n
+
n− (2m+ 1)
2n− (2m+ 1)
N)]
= P [
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i > 1−
n− (m+ 1)
2n− (2m+ 1)
]
= P [
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i >
n−m
2n− (2m+ 1)
]
≤ P [|
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i −
1
2
| >
n−m
2n− (2m+ 1)
−
1
2
]
It is easy to check that n−m2n−(2m+1) −
1
2 > 0.
Given that P [βi ⊕ β′i = 1] = 1/2, let N >
ln 2
( n−m
2n−(2m+1)
− 12 )
2
, this probability can be easily bounded
by
< 2 · e−2·N(
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
− 12 )
2
= 2 · e−N(
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
− 12 )
2
· e−N(
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
− 12 )
2
< e−N(
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
− 12 )
2
= εN
(ε = e−(
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
− 12 )
2
< 1) using Hoefding’s inequal-
ity.
If 2m+12n ≥
1
2 (i.e. 2m + 1 ≥ n, x =
(2m+1)−n
2m+1 ), then
the probability that Bob can get less than m bits is
given by
P [#{i|βi = β
′
i} < (N − x)m/n]
= P [
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i > N − (N −
(2m+ 1)− n
2m+ 1
N)m/n]
= P [
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i > 1−
m
2m+ 1
]
≤ P [|
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i −
1
2
| >
1
2
−
m
2m+ 1
]
It is easy to check that 12 −
m
2m+1 > 0.
Given that P [βi ⊕ β′i = 1] = 1/2, let N >
ln 2
( 12−
m
2m+1 )
2 ,
this probability can be easily bounded by
< 2 · e−2·N(
1
2−
m
2m+1 )
2
= 2 · e−N(
1
2−
m
2m+1 )
2
· e−N(
1
2−
m
2m+1 )
2
< e−N(
1
2−
m
2m+1 )
2
= εN
(ε = e−(
1
2−
m
2m+1 )
2
< 1) using Hoefding’s inequality.
So, Bob can get less than m bits that sent from Alice
with probability less than εN .
5.2 Privacy
We analyse the privacy of each party individually
as if he or she is facing a malicious opponent.
5.2.1 Privacy for Bob
Theorem 5.1 Alice can not find out much about
c1, c2, . . . , cm,
Proof. The only things Alice gets though the proto-
col are the sets J1, J2, . . . , Jn. βi’s and β
′
i’s are in-
dependent from each other. J1, J2, . . . , Jn will have
uniform distribution over all possible pairs of disjoint
subsets of size N−x
n
for i = 1, i = 2, . . . as well as
for i = n. Therefore Alice learns nothing about the
c1, c2, . . . , cm. ✷
5.2.2 Privacy for Alice
Theorem 5.2 Except with probability at most ǫn,
Bob can not find out much information about more
that m of b1, b2, . . . , bn.
Proof. The probability of that Bob gets more than m
bits (i.e. get at least m+ 1 bits). So
If 2m+12n <
1
2 (i.e. 2m + 1 < n, x =
n−(2m+1)
2n−(2m+1)N),
the probability that Bob can get more than m+1 bits
is given by
P [#{i|βi = β
′
i} − x ≥ (N − x)(m+ 1)/n]
= P [#{i|βi = β
′
i} ≥ (N − x)(m + 1)/n+ x]
= P [
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i ≤ N − ((N −
n− (2m+ 1)
2n− (2m+ 1)
N)(m
+1)/n+
n− (2m+ 1)
2n− (2m+ 1)
N)]
= P [
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i ≤ 1−
n−m
2n− (2m+ 1)
]
≤ P [|
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i −
1
2
| >
1
2
−
n−m
2n− (2m+ 1)
]
It is easy to check that 12 −
n−m
2n−(2m+1) > 0.
Given that P [βi ⊕ β′i = 1] = 1/2, let N >
ln 2
( 12−
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
)2
, this probability can be easily bounded
by
< 2 · e−2·N(
1
2−
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
)2
= 2 · e−N(
1
2−
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
)2 · e−N(
1
2−
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
)2
< e−N(
1
2−
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
)2
= εN
(ε = e−(
1
2−
n−m
2n−(2m+1)
)2 < 1) using Hoefding’s inequal-
ity.
If 2m+12n ≥
1
2 (i.e. 2m + 1 ≥ n, x =
(2m+1)−n
2m+1 ), then
the probability that Bob can get more than m+1 bits
is given by
P [#{i|βi = β
′
i} ≥ (N − x)(m+ 1)/n]
= P [
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i ≤ N − (N −
(2m+ 1)− n
2m+ 1
N)(m
+1)/n]
= P [
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i ≤ 1−
m+ 1
2m+ 1
]
≤ P [|
1
N
N∑
i=1
βi ⊕ β
′
i −
1
2
| >
m+ 1
2m+ 1
−
1
2
]
It is easy to check that m+12m+1 −
1
2 > 0.
Given that P [βi ⊕ β′i = 1] = 1/2, let N >
ln 2
( m+12m+1−
1
2 )
2
,
the probability can be easily bounded by
< 2 · e−2·N(
m+1
2m+1−
1
2 )
2
= 2 · e−N(
m+1
2m+1−
1
2 )
2
· e−N(
m+1
2m+1−
1
2 )
2
< e−N(
m+1
2m+1−
1
2 )
2
= εN
(ε = e−(
m+1
2m+1−
1
2 )
2
< 1) using Hoefding’s inequality.
Finally, we show that Bob cannot get more than m
bits by attacking the weak quantum bit commitment.
Let the probability that he can cheat Alice in the weak
QBC be p (0 < p < 1), the probability that he can get
one more bit is p
N−x
n < ǫN (ǫ = p
1
2n ).
So, Bob can get more than m bits that sent from
Alice with probability less than εN .
✷
In the 1-out-of-2 OT scheme, n = 2 and m = 1,
2m+1
2n =
3
4 >
1
2 , then the probability is less than
2 · e−N ·2(
m+1
2m+1−
1
2 )
2
= 2 · e−N ·2(
2
3−
1
2 )
2
= 2 · e−
N
18
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we construct an quantum m-out-of-
n OT based on the transmission of polarized light,
which is an extension of the quantum 1-out-f-2 OT,
and prove that this scheme satisfies statistical correct-
ness and statistical privacy, i.e. except with a small
probability ǫN , Bob can get the correct m bits, and
cannot get one more bit than required.
We think the following points is interesting for fur-
ther research:
1. Implement and apply the QOT in the real world.
2. Find a QOT satisfies perfect correctness and per-
fect privacy.
References
[1] Bennett, C.H. and Brassard, G., “Quantum
Cryptography: Public-key Distribution and Coin
Tossing“, In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal
Processing, Bangalore, India, December 1984, pp.
175-179.
[2] Brassard, G., Cre´peau, C. Jozsa, R. and Lan-
glois, D., “A Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme
Probably unbreakable by both parties“, In Pro-
ceedings of the 34th Annual IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science, November
1993, pp.362-371
[3] Claude Cre´peau. “Quantum Oblivious Transfer“.
Journal of Modern Optics, 41(12):2455C2466,
1994.
[4] Dorit Aharonov, Amnon Ta-Shma, Umesh V.
Vazirani, Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. “Quantum bit
escrow“. Proceedings of the 32nd Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing(STOC’00),
2000.
[5] Even, S., Goldreich, O. and Lempel, A., “A Ran-
domized Protocol for Signing Contracts“, Com-
munications of the ACM, vol. 28, pp. 637-647,
1985.
[6] W. Hoefding, “Probability Inequalities for Sums
of Bounded Random Variables“, Journal of the
American Statistical Association, Vol.58, 1936,
pp.13-30
[7] Mayers, D. “Unconditionally Secure Quantum
Bit Commitment is Impossible“. Physical Review
Letters 78 . pp 3414-3417 (28 April 1997).
[8] Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas. “Efficient Oblivious
Transfer Protocols“. SODA, 2001
[9] P. W. Shor, “Polynomial-Time Algorithms for
Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on
a Quantum Computer“, SIAM Journal on Com-
puting, V.26:(5), 1997.
[10] Rabin, M.O., “How to exchange secrets by Obliv-
ious Transfer“, technical report TR-81, Aiken
Computation Laboratory, Harvard University,
1981.
[11] Wiesner, S., “Conjugate coding“, Sigact News,
vol.15, no. 1, 1983, pp.78-88; Manuscript writ-
ten circa 1970, unpublished until it appeared in
SIGACT News.
[12] Yi Mu, Junqi Zhang, Vijay Varadharajan, ”m
out of n oblivious transfer,” ACISP 2002, Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science 2384, Springer
Verlag, 2002. pp. 395-405
